
Law enables strangers to act under shared rules, so there is ordinarily a genuine moral reason to obey it. If everyone followed only the provisions they personally approved, public order and other people’s reasonable expectations would be damaged. Yet being validly enacted does not automatically make a law just.
When Thoreau opposed slavery and the Mexican–American War in the nineteenth century, he argued that individuals could not excuse participation in injustice merely by obeying government. Rawls later described civil disobedience more narrowly as a public, non-violent, conscientious political breach of law intended to move the majority to correct serious injustice. This distinguishes it from covertly evading law for private benefit, although philosophers still dispute whether publicity, non-violence and acceptance of punishment are always required.
Suppose a law denies a minority equal citizenship and ordinary avenues of appeal have persistently failed. Publicly breaching that law may appeal to principles of justice shared by the political community. Refusing an inconvenient fee, by contrast, does not become civil disobedience simply because someone calls the rule unfair.
My judgement is that the duty to obey law is strong but not absolute. Clear and serious injustice, reasonable prior use of ordinary remedies, proportional action, public justification and accountability together strengthen the case for disobedience. Lawbreaking alone proves no courage. The real test is whether an action can oppose a law while still respecting others as equal citizens.
https://www.gutenberg.org/files/71/71-h/71-h.htm
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/civil-disobedience/
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