Does Toleration Mean Approval?

If I approve of a way of life, I do not need to “tolerate” it. Philosophical toleration contains an element of objection: I regard a belief or practice as mistaken, yet refrain from prohibiting or interfering with it because another set of reasons carries greater weight. The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy analyses this structure through objection, acceptance and rejection; only beyond a further limit does something become intolerable.

Locke’s A Letter Concerning Toleration was primarily directed against religious persecution. He argued that coercion cannot genuinely change inward belief and that political power should not treat the salvation of souls as its proper office. This was an argument within a particular historical dispute, not a complete modern theory of equal citizenship.

Suppose someone thinks a friend’s religious judgement is wrong but still recognises the friend’s freedom to live according to conscience. That can be toleration without approval. Yet the phrase “I allow you to exist” also reveals a problem: toleration can preserve a superior position for the person granting permission.

My view is that toleration is a necessary minimum of restraint in a plural society, but not the highest form of relationship. It asks us not to turn every disagreement into prohibition. It also requires scrutiny of the objection itself. If the objection rests on racial or identity prejudice, the task is not to preserve that prejudice more tolerantly, but to recognise that the other person was entitled to equal respect all along.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/toleration/
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/goldie-a-letter-concerning-toleration-and-other-writings