Does Fairness Mean Treating Everyone the Same?

“Treat like cases alike” is often taken as the simplest principle of fairness. In discussing distributive justice, Aristotle distinguished numerical equality from proportional equality: equal shares are just only when the relevant conditions are equal; where relevant conditions differ, mechanically giving everyone the same share may itself be unjust. The principle supplies a form, not an answer, because the difficult question remains: which differences are relevant?

Imagine a public building that requires everyone to use the same flight of stairs. The rule looks uniform, yet it does not give a wheelchair user an equal opportunity to enter. Adding a ramp creates different means of access, but if the purpose is to enable entry, it comes closer to showing equal concern. Modern theories of equality therefore distinguish identical treatment from treatment as an equal. Reasonable accommodation in disability justice puts that distinction into institutional practice.

The debate cannot end with “everyone is different”. If any difference can justify different treatment, prejudice can disguise itself as fairness. My judgement is that identical treatment should be the default starting point. Anyone departing from it bears the burden of explanation and must answer three questions: Is the difference genuinely relevant to the shared purpose? Is the distinction necessary for equal participation? Can the reason be publicly justified to those affected? Fairness does not require everyone to pass through the same door; it requires a consistent and defensible standard for deciding when a different door is needed.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/equality/
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/disability-justice/