Do Promises to Yourself Count as Real Promises?

“I promise myself I won't look at my phone after ten tonight.” This sounds like a promise, but it differs from promising a friend that you will collect them at ten. An interpersonal promise normally gives the promisee a measure of authority: they may demand performance or release the promisor. If promisor and promisee are the same person, tomorrow's reluctant self seems able to approve an immediate release, making the constraint look empty.

For that reason, many theories treat self-promises as resolutions, plans or vows rather than standard promises. Other philosophers argue that a person has authority to organise a life across time. A considered decision made today can give tomorrow's desires a reason they must answer. The issue is not whether certain words are magical, but whether a present self can genuinely constrain future action without treating that future self as a stranger.

Take the phone rule. If an urgent call arrives at eleven, changing the plan need not amount to betraying oneself. If every passing impulse is labelled an exception, however, the original decision can no longer coordinate one's life. No separate person is let down by a broken self-promise, but self-trust is affected: repeatedly making and casually cancelling commitments makes one's own plans less credible.

My view is that self-promises are not fully equivalent to interpersonal promises, so they cannot simply inherit the rule “perform unless released”. They are better understood as deliberated practical commitments. They may be revised, but revision should offer a reason that makes sense in light of the original aim, rather than allowing each present desire an automatic veto.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/promises/