Can an Outcome Be Unjust Without Discriminatory Intent?

Can an Outcome Be Unjust Without Discriminatory Intent?

A company has no rule barring carers from promotion, and no manager openly disparages anyone. Yet important projects and trust are repeatedly allocated during after-hours gatherings. People who can stay gain experience, while those who must collect children on time find it increasingly difficult to enter core roles. If each invitation arises from ordinary socialising, can the result still be unjust?

Political philosopher Iris Marion Young described this kind of problem as structural injustice: many people act within practices regarded as normal, but their interactions systematically leave some groups with fewer opportunities or greater constraints. Her social connection model of responsibility differs from a model concerned only with identifying a single liable wrongdoer. We need not first prove discriminatory intent by one manager before examining the cumulative effects of meeting times, information channels and promotion criteria.

Yet “structure” should not become a slogan for distributing blame equally. My judgement is that fault and responsibility for repair must be separated. Malice, knowledge and power still affect how blameworthy a person is; those able to change scheduling, make project allocation visible or audit promotion outcomes carry stronger forward-looking responsibilities. The absence of deliberate discrimination may reduce some personal blame, but it does not prove that the result is fair or excuse inaction.

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0265052506060043


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