Can a Voluntary Agreement Still Be Exploitative?

If two people agree to a transaction and both are better off than they would have been without it, can the arrangement still be exploitative? Contemporary philosophy commonly describes exploitation as taking unfair advantage of another person. Marx’s theory of labour exploitation has been especially influential, but exploitation is not limited to employment and may occur within a voluntary transaction.

Imagine a driver with a flat tyre on a remote road. A nearby person offers to rent out a jack, but only at a price far above the normal level. The driver understands the terms, faces no direct threat and voluntarily accepts. The driver receives help and the other person receives money, so both benefit. Yet the driver has almost no workable alternative, and the price takes advantage of that vulnerability. Consent remains valid here, but it does not prove that the terms are fair.

The difficulty is that unequal prices or unfortunate circumstances do not automatically amount to exploitation. Some theories ask whether a transaction departs from a fair baseline; others focus on dominance or on whether the other person is respected as an end. My judgement is that consent should rule out coercion, but should not end the moral enquiry. We must also ask whether alternatives are real, whether benefits are grossly unbalanced, and whether one party’s gain arises precisely from a predicament the other cannot escape. Banning every such exchange may remove the vulnerable person’s only option. A better response often preserves the help while limiting unfair profit from the predicament.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/exploitation/