Are You Responsible If You Forgot What You Promised?

You promise to water a neighbour’s plants while they are away, but remember only after the leaves have wilted. Forgetting does not seem like a choice made at the crucial moment: we cannot simply decide to recall something as we decide to raise a hand. Is “I forgot” therefore enough to remove responsibility?

In Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle distinguishes mere ignorance from ignorance connected to a condition for which the agent may be answerable. Contemporary theories of moral responsibility develop this through conditions of control and awareness, and through “tracing”: although the immediate lapse was not directly controlled, responsibility may trace back to an earlier point when the person could respond to reasons. If you know you often forget, understand that several dry days will harm the plant, yet set no reminder or backup, the lapse is not an isolated psychological accident. A promise gives you reason to look after your own attention and memory in advance.

Tracing must not become the claim that every instance of forgetting is blameworthy. The importance of the task, foreseeability of the risk, cost of safeguards, the person’s capacities and unexpected disruption all affect how much blame is appropriate. A memory failure caused by sudden illness is not equivalent to casually agreeing and making no arrangement at all.

My judgement is that forgetting itself is often involuntary, while responsibility can arise from negligent management of an obligation. This avoids treating every memory lapse as a defect of character, without allowing the words “I forgot” to erase the duty of care created by a promise.

https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/
https://classics.mit.edu/Aristotle/nicomachaen.3.iii.html