A Historic Meeting, a Limited Peace: After the China–US–Russia Trilateral Talks in Shenzhen

A Historic Meeting, a Limited Peace: After the China–US–Russia Trilateral Talks in Shenzhen

On 19 November 2026, the heads of state of China, the United States and Russia held their first formal trilateral meeting in Shenzhen. This was undoubtedly a historic event.

Its historical significance lies first in its format. The leaders of three permanent members of the UN Security Council sat down specifically for talks in which all three participated on an equal footing. This was unprecedented in modern diplomatic history. Although the leaders of these countries have appeared together at the United Nations, APEC and other multilateral gatherings, a dedicated trilateral meeting of heads of state is a different matter.

However, we should not assume that a historic format makes the event itself equally important in historical terms. The format of a meeting is one thing; the problems it actually resolves and its effects on the world are another.

We should first recognise that, although China, the United States and Russia are all important powers in today’s world, their importance rests on different foundations.

The United States is a relatively comprehensive global power. It has deep strengths in the size of its economy, military capabilities, science and technology, financial system, higher education, cultural influence and the international role of the dollar. Its economic and political decisions can quickly affect other parts of the world.

China’s international influence has different foundations. Its vast population and market, manufacturing capacity built up over decades, integrated industrial supply chains and growing technological capabilities make it an indispensable part of the global economy. China has a particularly broad international influence through the application of technology, industrialisation and infrastructure development.

Russia’s position is different again. Although it is a large economy, its total economic output is substantially smaller than that of the United States or China. Russia has an important role in energy, natural resources and military industry, but its greatest strategic influence still comes from its enormous nuclear arsenal and the military deterrence it provides.

So, although these three countries sit at the same conference table, the kinds of power they represent are quite different.

Some people have combined the initials of China, America and Russia into CAR, the English word for a motor vehicle, imagining the three countries driving the world forward together.

It is an interesting metaphor, but, on closer examination, it hardly seems an adequate representation of the whole world.

If we must use a car as a metaphor, I would see the United States as something like its engine, providing important technological innovation and financial and economic power. China is more like the manufacturing and integration system for the body and its many components, bringing together technology, materials, production and markets. Russia’s enormous nuclear arsenal is more like a load of dangerous cargo carried aboard the vehicle.

Of course, this is only a rough analogy. The United States also depends on global manufacturing, China has technological innovation of its own, and Russia has more than nuclear weapons. But the analogy at least illustrates the differences in the roles these countries play, and the ways they exert influence, within the international system.

More importantly, even if this car can get moving, it cannot be said to represent the entire world.

Where is Europe? Where is India? Where are Japan, Canada, Australia, and the countries of Africa and South America? These countries and regions have not only large populations, substantial economies and technological capabilities, but also their own political systems, historical experiences and interests.

The three countries can discuss their relations, and they need to discuss nuclear security and international stability. But such coordination should not be taken to mean that they have the right to decide the futures of other countries. The world’s political structure can no longer be reduced to relations among a few major powers from the Second World War.

Now consider what the talks actually achieved.

The Peace Declaration by the Heads of State of China, Russia and the United States, issued after the meeting, contains only four points.

The first concerns promoting UN reform. This is certainly an important issue, but the declaration does not specify what should be reformed, how reform should proceed, or how the UN’s longstanding structural problems should be addressed. It therefore remains a statement of general principle.

The second concerns increasing the production and supply of refined petroleum products and ensuring stable energy flows. Energy supplies do affect international stability and may indirectly affect wars and conflicts. Yet the inclusion of increased refined fuel supplies as a principal outcome of a declaration devoted to peace itself suggests how little common ground the three countries could find on more important political and security issues.

The third concerns the International Criminal Court, emphasising the immunity of state officials and the need to prevent abuses of jurisdiction.

This point deserves particular attention. One of the ICC’s important tasks is to hold individuals accountable for serious international crimes, including war crimes and crimes against humanity. The relationship between the immunity of state officials and international criminal justice is already legally complex.

With Russian President Vladimir Putin still subject to an ICC arrest warrant, the three countries’ joint emphasis on this issue cannot be dismissed as inconsequential diplomatic language. It concerns the relationship between state sovereignty, political power and accountability under international law.

The fourth reaffirms that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and commits the countries to dialogue on reducing nuclear risks and preventing nuclear proliferation.

This consensus has some value, but it remains far removed from an actual nuclear disarmament agreement. The declaration specifies no numbers for nuclear weapons reductions, concrete negotiating arrangements, implementation timetable or verification mechanism. The three countries have different nuclear force structures and strategic objectives. Turning a shared statement of principle into practical action will require considerable further work.

Taken together, the four points reveal a clear feature: the declaration covers several international issues but offers no concrete plan for peace.

In particular, the ongoing war in Ukraine does not appear in this peace declaration. This leaves a substantial gap between the declaration’s actual content and its stated theme of peace.

This does not mean that a conversation among the three leaders has no value. Even without a concrete agreement, direct communication among three countries with large nuclear arsenals still has positive significance. Amid international tensions, dialogue at least offers a chance to avoid miscalculation.

But the extent of that value still depends on what follows. We cannot assume that the three countries have made a major contribution to peace simply because they have issued a peace declaration.

The arrangements for the meeting also gave it a strongly ceremonial character.

In the publicly available footage, the three leaders mainly read prepared statements. Closed-door discussions followed, so the public footage alone cannot establish that no substantive exchange took place. The joint declaration had clearly been coordinated in advance, which is normal practice for major diplomatic meetings.

The more useful question is why the three countries were able to agree on a declaration of such limited substance.

My judgement is that they shared at least one objective: they wanted the meeting to take place and to produce some result.

This was particularly important for China.

The meeting took place in Shenzhen, which was already the host city for this APEC gathering. We therefore cannot simply infer that China chose Shenzhen to deliberately downplay Beijing’s political symbolism. However, compared with a dedicated trilateral summit in the capital, a meeting during an international multilateral gathering can appear more natural and more readily convey the impression of consultation among equals.

This brings to mind the Shanghai Communiqué of 1972.

The major political meetings during Nixon’s visit to China took place in Beijing, while the Shanghai Communiqué was ultimately issued in Shanghai. Shanghai had a distinctive diplomatic significance as the place where the communiqué was issued, but that does not mean the relevant talks could not have been held in Beijing.

Likewise, Shenzhen’s selection as the venue cannot itself be treated as proof of the diplomatic intentions behind this trilateral meeting. What can be established is that China used the international setting of APEC to host an unprecedented trilateral meeting of heads of state.

Had the meeting produced no result, or exposed serious disagreements in public, China’s diplomatic achievement as host would have been greatly diminished.

As it happened, the meeting went ahead, the three countries issued a joint declaration, and there was no public diplomatic confrontation among the leaders. In that sense, China achieved at least a basic objective.

Although the declaration’s four points fall well short of its theme of peace, a common document was nevertheless produced.

Some result is better than none. Even a limited outcome shows that the three countries can still find some shared language and are willing to display that agreement publicly.

I therefore think China can be considered the biggest apparent winner from the meeting, having achieved at least a success in the form of its diplomacy.

But that success needs to be qualified.

It does not mean China has secured a breakthrough on major international issues, nor does it show that the three countries will be able to coordinate their positions over the long term. Still less can a smoothly conducted meeting alone establish that China successfully arranged or controlled the entire process.

Russia also gained significant diplomatic benefits. Putin’s appearance on the international stage alongside the US and Chinese leaders as an equal participant in a trilateral meeting helps Russia demonstrate its status as a major power.

For the United States, Trump can also present the meeting as a diplomatic achievement in promoting dialogue among major powers.

All three countries have outcomes of their own to showcase. It is therefore unsurprising that the talks produced a joint declaration.

But shared diplomatic interests do not amount to shared values on international peace.

This leads to a deeper concern I have about the meeting.

Russia launched a full-scale war of aggression against Ukraine, and the war is still ongoing. In these circumstances, the leaders of the United States, China and Russia sat down together and issued a joint declaration devoted to peace, yet offered no concrete arrangements for peace in that war.

What message does this send to the international community?

National leaders can, of course, negotiate with the leader of a country that is waging war. Sometimes, ending a war may even require direct negotiations with the person who started it. Diplomatic engagement should not in itself be understood as approval of the war.

However, when a meeting mainly emphasises friendship and shared responsibilities among three major powers while avoiding a major ongoing war of aggression, its political symbolism becomes problematic.

The problem becomes even more pronounced when the three countries present themselves as guardians of world peace and leaders of the international order.

It may create the impression that a country with sufficient military strength, particularly nuclear weapons, can still secure equal treatment in international politics through its major-power status, even when involved in a serious international conflict.

Whether that impression will be borne out cannot be determined from a single meeting. But the logic of international politics that it suggests deserves scrutiny.

For this reason, too, I do not think these trilateral talks can be placed on the same footing as the Yalta Conference.

The Yalta Conference and other major Allied conferences during the Second World War took place in a specific historical context. The participating countries were fighting a common war against the Axis powers and discussing major questions concerning the end of the war and the postwar international order.

We can certainly criticise the way major powers decided the fate of smaller countries within the Yalta system, and we need not endorse all the political arrangements that emerged. But the practical problems those conferences addressed, and the concrete decisions they produced, were entirely different from those of the Shenzhen talks.

Although the Shenzhen meeting was historic in its format, it did not produce international arrangements of comparable significance.

More importantly, more than eighty years have passed since the Second World War ended, and the Cold War has long been over. Today’s global political and economic structure can no longer be understood simply through the distribution of power among the victorious countries.

Permanent membership of the UN Security Council is part of the existing international system. But that institutional position does not give these countries’ political judgements an inherently greater moral legitimacy.

A country’s status as a victor in the Second World War does not make all its international conduct today legitimate.

Equally, the absence of a permanent seat on the Security Council does not mean that a country is less important in today’s world than some permanent members.

Europe, Japan, India and many other countries and regions play indispensable roles in the global economy, technology, trade, politics and security.

If the purpose is simply to discuss nuclear risks among China, the United States and Russia, a separate meeting of the three countries is reasonable.

But if the discussion concerns the future of the whole world, or even the creation of some framework for international peace, participation by these three countries alone is clearly insufficiently representative.

At a minimum, the major European countries should participate. Britain and France are themselves permanent members of the Security Council. Germany, Japan, India and other internationally influential countries should also have a place in international arrangements that affect their own security and interests.

In matters concerning the war in Ukraine in particular, Ukraine is a direct party whose sovereignty and security interests cannot be decided on its behalf by other major powers.

My final assessment of the trilateral talks is therefore a limited one.

They did make history, but mainly through their diplomatic format.

They did produce a joint declaration, but its concrete achievements fell short of its theme of peace.

China, as host, succeeded in organising the meeting and presenting a diplomatic achievement, but this does not yet constitute a major breakthrough in the pursuit of international peace.

The United States and Russia also gained political benefits of their own. Russia’s renewed appearance as an equal major power in this kind of international setting has a symbolic significance that warrants particular attention.

Whether the meeting will have a deeper historical impact depends on whether the three countries take meaningful action, particularly to reduce nuclear risks, help bring the war to an end and uphold international law.

Without such developments, what the meeting ultimately leaves behind may be little more than the historic image of the three leaders seated at the same table and a peace declaration of limited substance.

Historical novelty and historical importance do not always coincide. The Shenzhen trilateral talks offer an example that calls for a careful distinction between the two.