
16 November 2026
In an interview on 15 November, US Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said NVIDIA should look outside the company for its next CEO and make substantial changes. He also called on the board and its outside lawyers to explain the company’s culture of compliance with export controls within ten days. His remarks gave more concrete support to an earlier assessment: the issues raised by this crisis extend beyond Jensen Huang personally to NVIDIA’s governance and internal culture.[1]
Following Huang’s departure, events have naturally developed along two connected strands. One concerns how NVIDIA continues to operate, finds a new CEO and changes a system of governance long built around its founder. The other concerns establishing what happened in matters involving Huang, other individuals, transactions and decisions, with implications for US chip export policy, regulatory enforcement and national security. The company needs to move forward, while what has already happened still requires an explanation.
The most urgent task in the first of these is to find a permanent CEO. NVIDIA’s announcement on 12 November confirmed that Huang had resigned as president, CEO and a board member. Chief Financial Officer Colette Kress would also serve as interim CEO, while Harvey C. Jones became the company’s first board chair. At the time, the board said it would consider both internal and external candidates. Bessent’s call for an outsider therefore amounts to a clear demand about the direction of the search; it should not be treated as a decision the board has already made.[2]
The creation of a board chair position is itself a sign that the governance structure is changing. NVIDIA already had a board, independent directors and a lead independent director, so oversight arrangements did exist. Whether those formal roles could effectively constrain the founder in practice is a separate question.[2][3]
In a public interview in 2024, Huang said that NVIDIA had 60 members of its leadership team reporting directly to him. He argued that this reduced management layers, gave everyone access to information at the same time and allowed them to develop a shared understanding of problems and their solutions. There were reasons for adopting this approach in the interests of efficiency. Its past value should not be dismissed simply because the company is now in crisis.[4]
Fewer management layers and the distribution of authority are different things, however. If a great deal of coordination across departments and many critical judgements depend personally on the CEO, a flatter organisation may also become more dependent on one central figure’s ability, energy and judgement. Sustained success can make that dependence seem entirely natural, until the person suddenly becomes unable to continue and the company’s vulnerability is exposed. Even without any personal wrongdoing, illness, an accident or an abrupt departure can bring that risk into reality.
I previously suggested, cautiously, that some aspects of NVIDIA’s internal culture might be ‘toxic’. That assessment concerns a tendency that deserves attention: when a founder’s contributions are treated as grounds for exceptions to the rules, personal loyalty overrides professional judgement, or compliance advice is ignored because it gets in the way of performance, an organisation gradually loses its ability to correct itself. The extent to which NVIDIA has these problems must be established through investigation and subsequent changes in governance. A flat management structure alone cannot settle the question.
Changing someone’s mind is difficult, especially when their ideas have brought enormous success and become embedded in the way an entire company works. Asking such a leader to change often also means asking them to reassess past decisions, alter the relationships they have built within the organisation and even place limits on their own authority. Those around them may already be accustomed to that system. When a company needs major changes, replacing its leadership is therefore often the most direct approach: reform need not depend entirely on the existing leader changing first.
This gives Bessent’s insistence on an external CEO a clear significance for governance. An outsider is less constrained by existing relationships within the company and has an opportunity to re-examine practices that have long been taken for granted. An outsider must also learn the business and earn the team’s trust, however, and a change of leadership does not guarantee successful reform. The new CEO needs real authority, the board must be able to oversee that CEO, and the company needs a durable division of responsibilities and arrangements for succession. Otherwise, the dependence once concentrated on Huang will simply be transferred to someone else.
The second strand concerns investigation and the determination of responsibility. On 8 November, NVIDIA’s board announced an investigation overseen by a committee of independent directors with assistance from independent outside counsel. Huang’s departure does not mean that the relevant facts have been established or that the company’s internal investigation has ended.[5]
Congressional oversight is also continuing. On 12 November, the chairs of three relevant House committees renewed their request for Huang, NVIDIA’s general counsel and Commerce Department officials to appear and explain the situation. By 15 November, committee chair John Moolenaar said Huang and NVIDIA had agreed to an interview, with the date still being arranged. This represents progress in the investigative process; it does not mean questioning has been completed, much less that responsibility has been determined.[6][7]
The Justice Department’s investigations involve more specific questions of evidence and law. On 12 November, Attorney General Todd Blanche said investigations concerning the individuals involved and chip exports were ongoing, while explicitly stating that the department had not reached a conclusion about whether the individual in question was a spy. Any connections among personal relationships, conflicts of interest, access to business information and export violations must be established individually. Their appearance in the same controversy does not, by itself, turn them into a proven chain of cause and effect.[8]
The investigations also need to establish whether the company identified risks involving its trading partners and the ultimate destination of its chips, who had access to relevant information, what advice compliance staff gave and what decisions management made. If warnings were raised but not acted on, the reasons need to be established. If anyone used their position to influence an investigation, disclosure or transaction decision, responsibility must likewise be determined from the record. These questions turn on documents, communications and approval processes that can be examined.
US government policy and its implementation have also come under scrutiny. On 11 November, Senators Elizabeth Warren and Chris Coons called on the Commerce Department, the State Department and the White House to preserve records relating to NVIDIA’s chip exports to China and the associated national security risks. The questions therefore extend beyond the company’s actions to how export licences were handled, how information about risks was communicated and how government agencies enforced existing rules.[9]
These two strands will influence each other, but neither can substitute for the other. NVIDIA cannot wait for every investigation to conclude before appointing a leader, maintaining operations and adjusting its governance. Nor can a change of leadership end the examination of past responsibility. The new management team needs to help establish the facts, while institutional weaknesses uncovered by the investigations will help determine how far governance changes need to go.
The possibility of Huang’s return must also be understood in this context. Bessent’s call for an external CEO adds to the obstacles to a return in the near term. At the same time, Elon Musk and others have publicly supported his return, so the outcome remains uncertain. The earlier assessment that he was unlikely to return now has further support on governance grounds, but it cannot yet be said to have been conclusively validated.[1][7]
If NVIDIA does need to reduce its dependence on its founder, restoring him to his former position would still require answers to a specific question: what has changed in the allocation of authority and the way the company works, and what oversight can now function effectively? Without those changes, his return might provide temporary reassurance while leaving the underlying governance risks in place.
Sources
[1] Reuters, 15 November 2026: Bessent calls for NVIDIA to seek an external CEO (republished by Euronext)
https://live.euronext.com/en/financial-news/bessent-says-nvidia-must-go-outside-company-find-new-ceo
[2] NVIDIA, 12 November 2026: CEO transition announcement
https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/nvidia-announces-ceo-transition
[3] NVIDIA 2026 proxy statement: Board leadership structure and lead independent director
https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1045810/000104581026000036/nvda-20260512.htm
[4] Stripe Sessions 2024: A conversation with NVIDIA’s Jensen Huang, with transcript
https://stripe.com/au/sessions/2024/a-conversation-with-nvidias-jensen-huang
[5] NVIDIA Board, 8 November 2026: Announcement of an independent investigation
https://nvidianews.nvidia.com/news/statement-from-nvidia-board-of-directors
[6] US House Foreign Affairs Committee, 12 November 2026: Three committee chairs renew requests for appearances
https://foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/press-releases/chairmen-mast-moolenaar-and-crawford-send-second-request-to-jensen-huang-and-nvidia-to-brief-congress-on-the-chinese-intelligence-asset
[7] AFP, updated 16 November 2026: Bessent’s comments, congressional interview arrangements and the open letter supporting Huang’s return
https://www.afp.com/en/us-treasury-chief-wants-answers-soon-nvidia-0
[8] Reuters press conference transcript, 12 November 2026: Blanche says no conclusion has been reached about Alice Huang’s alleged spy status (republished by MarketScreener)
https://www.marketscreener.com/news/blanche-says-doj-has-not-concluded-alice-huang-was-chinese-spy-ce785ed9d881f323
[9] US Senate Banking Committee minority, 11 November 2026: Senators request preservation of NVIDIA-related government records
https://www.banking.senate.gov/newsroom/minority/senators-warren-and-coons-direct-lutnick-rubio-and-miller-to-preserve-nvidia-records-following-reports-of-foreign-intelligence-operation-targeting-ceo-jensen-huang
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